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Ignoring the Writing on the Wall:  The Role of
Enterprise Risk Management in the Economic
Crisis
The recent economic crisis and global recession were devastating, but were
they really a surprise to those in the financial sector? In January 2005, Federal
Reserve Governor Edward Gramlich warned about instability in the subprime
mortgage market and possible corrections in the housing market, noting “[t]he
subprime incidence of mortgage brokers without a lot at stake in the game is get-
ting pretty high.”1 Likewise, reports indicated that “[r]eal estate gains came to an
abrupt halt in the first quarter of 2006, with the median price of a U.S. home
falling 3.3 percent from the fourth quarter of 2005.”2 And in February 2006, Wash-
ington Mutual cut 2,500 jobs, followed by similar workforce reductions at Lehman
Brothers and National City in 2007.3
Regulatory agencies and industry organizations also began warning of liquidity
issues in the financial markets in late 2006 and early 2007.4 When asked about these
warnings, former Citigroup CEO, Charles Prince, responded: “When the music
stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is
playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing . . . .”5 Less than four
months after Mr. Prince’s statement, Citigroup announced a $6.5 billion write-
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1. Sue Kirchhoff, Subprime Lending a Worry for Fed Exec, USA Today, Jan. 13, 2005, at 6B.
2. Les Christie, Real Estate Cools Down, CNNMoney.com, May 16, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/05/
15/real_estate/NAR_firstQ2005_home_prices/index.htm.
3. Washington Mutual to Cut 2,500 Jobs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 2006, at C2; Yalman Onaran & Elizabeth
Hester, Lehman Brothers, National City Cut Jobs as More Home Loans Sour, Bloomberg.com, Sept. 6, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=AYNLkXpO4K3I.
4. See, e.g., Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, Fin. Market
Trends, Feb. 2009, at 4, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/1/42229620.pdf.
5. Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-Outs, FT.com, July 9, 2007,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-821c-0000779fd2ac.html.
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Ignoring the Writing on the Wall
down and Mr. Prince’s resignation.6 Citigroup, under Mr. Prince’s leadership, took
a bullish approach to the crisis and firm risk management, and its stakeholders
ultimately paid a significant price.
This essay examines the different approaches to enterprise risk management
(ERM) adopted by financial institutions affected by the 2008 economic crisis and
how ERM contributed to the survival or failure of those firms.7 It then considers
ERM in the broader context of corporate governance generally. This discussion
reflects on ERM techniques for corporate boards and whether boards do or should
have a duty to implement an effective ERM program. The essay concludes by en-
couraging boards, stakeholders, and policymakers to give more attention to ERM
programs.
erm and the economic crisis
ERM typically is defined as:
[A] process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other
personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to
identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be
within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achieve-
ment of entity objectives.8
ERM integrates behavioral risk management—e.g., corporate governance—with
technical or purely financial risk management, such as financial modeling and
stress testing.9 Although both types of risk management showed significant weak-
nesses in the 2008 economic crisis, this essay concentrates on the corporate govern-
ance aspects of ERM.
6. Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Citigroup CEO Resigns; Former Treasury Chief Named Chairman, Wash. Post,
Nov. 5, 2007, at A16.
7. This essay uses the term “2008 economic crisis” to reference the entire period of financial turmoil,
which became widely evident in late 2007 and continued into 2009.
8. Comm. of Sponsoring Orgs. of the Treadway Comm’n (COSO), Enterprise Risk Manage-
ment—Integrated Framework: Executive Summary 2 (2004), http://www.coso.org/Publications/ERM/
COSO_ERM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf [hereinafter COSO Report].
9. ERM targets overall firm risk strategy and thus includes all types of potential risk impacting firm
performance. These risks can be categorized broadly as financial risks; operational risks; business risks; litiga-
tion risks; and governance and human resource risks. See, e.g., The Conference Board, The Role of U.S.
Corporate Boards in Enterprise Risk Management 11(2006) [hereinafter Conference Board Report];
see also Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and Corporate Governance, 39
Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 571, 584 (2008) (“Under ERM, risks can be viewed as falling into two broad areas: core risks
(risks which a firm should have a competitive advantage to handle in their business model) and non-core risks
(risks which could be hedged by the business or transferred through risk management techniques).”); Martin
Lipton et al., Risk Management and the Board of Directors 7–13 (2008), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/files/2008/11/risk-management-and-the-board-of-directors.pdf (identifying thirteen areas of risk that
boards should consider in designing and implementing ERM programs).
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ERM targets overall corporate strategy and, when implemented correctly, can
manage a corporation’s risk appetite and exposure. When ignored or underutilized,
it can contribute to a corporation’s demise.10 In fact, many commentators point to
ERM failures as contributing to the severity of the 2008 economic crisis. As one
industry observer stated: “[T]he financial crisis is the result of a failure of risk
management [in the banking and securities markets] on a colossal scale. . . . How
did so many major financial players miss or overlook such huge, systemic
exposures?”11
A study by the Senior Supervisors Group also suggests that firms with more
integrated ERM programs addressed the issues presented by the crisis in a more
efficient and effective manner.12 The study found that “[f]irms that avoided [signifi-
cant] problems demonstrated a comprehensive approach to viewing firm-wide ex-
posures and risk, sharing quantitative and qualitative information more efficiently
across the firm and engaging in more effective dialogue across the management
team.”13 It also identified weaknesses in certain firms’ communication and under-
standing of risk appetite, balance sheet growth, and liquidity needs. For example,
risk managers at UBS learned of potential significant subprime losses in early 2007,
but senior management did not understand the extent of the losses until July and
did not report the issue to the board until August.14
The findings of the study and the movement toward more integrated ERM are
logical. The earlier a problem is detected and addressed, the more effective the
treatment. Boards may not have been able to prevent the crisis itself. Systemic risk
frequently is difficult to identify and manage.15 Nevertheless, boards and senior
10. Government officials and commentators alike have recognized the failure of most firms’ ERM in con-
nection with the 2008 economic crisis. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (May 15, 2008),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080515a.htm; Roger Barker, Observa-
tions on the Current Crisis from a Corporate Governance Perspective, Inst. Directors, Feb. 20, 2009, at 2, http://
www.iod.com/intershoproot/eCS/Store/en/pdfs/article_responding_crisis.pdf.
11. Risk & Ins. Mgmt. Soc’y, Inc., The 2008 Financial Crisis: A Wake-Up Call for Enterprise Risk
Management 3 (Bill Coffin ed., 2009), http://www.RIMS.org/ERMwhitepaper (follow “2008 Financial Crisis a
Wake-Up Call for ERM” hyperlink) (quoting Robert P. Hartwig, President of the Insurance Information
Institute).
12. See Senior Supervisors Group, Observations on Risk Management Practices During the Re-
cent Market Turbulence (2008), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking/2008/ssg_risk_mgt_
doc_final.pdf. The Senior Supervisors Group represents supervisory agencies from several countries, including
the United States, United Kingdom, and France. Id. at 22. The study evaluated the risk management practices
of eleven major financial institutions involved in the 2008 economic crisis. Id. at 1. Although the Senior Super-
visor’s Group Study focused on financial firms, the same ERM concepts also apply to non-financial firms.
Kirkpatrick, supra note 4, at 17–18 (discussing ERM in the context of non-financial firms).
13. Kirkpatrick, supra note 4, at 8 (summarizing findings of the Senior Supervisors Group Study).
14. Id. at 11–12.
15. Systemic risk can be defined as “ ‘the probability that cumulative losses will occur from an event that
ignites a series of successive losses along a chain of [financial] institutions or markets comprising . . . a sys-
tem.’”  Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 Geo. L.J. 193, 196–97 (2008) (quoting Alan Greenspan, Remarks
at a Conference on Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. (Nov. 16,
1995)). Duke Professor Steven Schwarcz has examined various definitions of systemic risk, identifying the
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 47
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Ignoring the Writing on the Wall
management teams likely could have mitigated losses and the severity of the crisis
with more information and a better understanding of their firms’ overall financial
positions.
But is this type of oversight the board’s responsibility? The following discussion
considers the appropriate role of the board in ERM and, in turn, the role of ERM
in corporate governance.
erm, the board, and corporate governance
Certain key elements of ERM suggest that its implementation is a function of the
board.16 These elements include objective setting, risk assessment, risk response,
and communicating and monitoring the firm’s overall risk position.17 The board
cannot achieve ERM without the assistance of managers at all levels of the firm. As
demonstrated by the 2008 economic crisis, boards cannot, however, completely
relegate ERM responsibility to senior or lower management or an already over-
burdened audit committee.18
Several organizations outline a meaningful role for the board in ERM or ERM-
like activities. For example, the Principles of Corporate Governance promulgated
by the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development list the following
as board responsibilities: “[r]eviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans
of action, risk policy, annual budgets and business plans; setting performance
objectives; monitoring implementation and corporate performance . . . .”19 Simi-
larly, the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance charge the
common trait of a triggering event, and has proposed regulations that establish a “liquidity-provider of last
resort” to minimize systemic risk. Id. at 241–42. In response to the 2008 economic crisis, regulators are rethink-
ing ways to detect and reduce systemic risk. See, e.g., Financial System Regulation: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Financial Serv., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Tim Geithner, Treasury Secretary, U.S. Department of the
Treasury), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg71.htm (suggesting ways to reduce systemic risk,
including the creation of a separate entity to monitor risk); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address
at the Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20090310a.htm (same).
16. Specifically, ERM implicates the board’s duty to be informed fully, act in good faith, and implement
appropriate oversight procedures. These and other board duties in the context of ERM are discussed below. See
infra notes 46–61, 65–71 and accompanying text.
17. See COSO Report, supra note 8, at 3–4. The COSO Report details the components of an integrated
ERM program; the roles of the board, senior management, and others in that program; and the importance of
prioritizing all types of firm personnel in developing risk-related strategies. Id. at 3–4, 6–7.
18. See Conference Board Report, supra note 9, at 26 (explaining that “[i]n examining the committee
charters of the Top 100 Fortune companies, 66 percent of company charters explicitly ascribe risk solely to their
audit committee” and commenting that “audit committees, already overburdened, may not have the skills to
oversee an enterprise-wide risk management program which would be based on a wider range of issues than
financial reporting and controls”); Kirkpatrick, supra note 4, at 5–12 (examining ERM structures and their role
in the 2008 economic crisis). Notably, Citigroup follows this approach, assigning risk responsibilities at the
board level to an Audit and Risk Management Committee. See Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at
51 (Feb. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Citigroup 10-K 2009] (for the period ending Dec. 31, 2008).
19. Org. of Econ. Co-operation and Dev., OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 24 (2004),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf [hereinafter OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance].
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board to “[o]versee the conduct of the corporation’s business to evaluate whether
the business is being properly managed . . . [and to review and,] where appropriate,
approve the corporation’s financial objectives and major corporate plans and
actions.”20
Nevertheless, studies of corporate boards indicate a lax approach or, at best, a
general indifference toward ERM.21 In a survey of senior financial executives, sev-
enty-two percent of the respondents “expressed concern about their own com-
pany’s risk management practices and ability to meet strategic plans.”22 A survey of
board audit committees indicated that only forty-six percent of respondents were
very satisfied with their company’s process for identifying risk, and only thirty-
eight percent were satisfied with the risk reports they received from management.23
Perhaps the 2008 economic crisis will encourage boards to reassess their firms’
ERM programs. At least one of the surveys discussed above suggests this to be the
case.24 In addition, Standard & Poor’s is incorporating the strength of firms’ ERM
into its ratings calculation.25  These signs are encouraging. Whether memories of
the crisis result in long-term change or simply fade quickly, however, remains to be
seen.
erm best practices: lessons from the economic crisis
As discussed above, UBS’s risk management process failed to detect in a timely
manner or mitigate the consequences of the 2008 economic crisis. UBS addressed
these issues in its 2008 annual report, explaining:
20. Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis & Recommendations § 3.02(a)(2)–(3) (Am. Law
Inst. 1992) [hereinafter ALI Principles of Corporate Governance]. The reporter’s note to ALI Principles of
Corporate Governance also explains that, in determining whether action is within the authority of senior
executives or requires board action, parties should consider “the economic magnitude of the action in relation
to corporate assets and earnings, the extent of risk involved, the time span of the action’s effect, and the cost of
reversing the action.” Id. § 3.01 Reporter’s Note. The notes further suggest that board action is required for
“actions that would foreseeably expose the corporation to significant litigation or significant new regulatory
problems.” Id.
21. See, e.g., Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 9, at 584 (“Evidence from studies and surveys indicates that, to
date, only about 10% of major companies claim to have implemented many aspects of ERM, while almost all
the others claim that they plan to do so in the future.”).
22. Towers Perrin, Financial Crisis Intensifies Interest in Risk Management Among CFOs
(2008), http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/showdctmdoc.jsp?url=master_Brand_2/USA/News/Spotlights/2008/
Sept/2008_09_30_spotlight_cfo_survey.htm#.
23. Audit Committees Put Risk Management at the Top of Their Agendas, KPMG, June 16, 2008, http://
www.kpmg.co.uk/news/detail.cfm?pr=3120 (discussing a survey of approximately 1,000 audit committee mem-
bers from companies around the world conducted between November 2007 and March 2008).
24. See Towers Perrin, supra note 22 (noting that fifty-five percent of respondents anticipated changes in
risk management practices).
25. Standard & Poor’s, Enterprise Risk Management: Standard & Poor’s to Apply Enterprise
Risk Analysis to Corporate Ratings 2 (2008), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/events/CRTcon
ERM5908.pdf (“[W]e will enhance [the] ratings process for nonfinancial companies through an enterprise risk
management (ERM) review.”).
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Ignoring the Writing on the Wall
UBS was severely affected by the financial crisis that unfolded in 2007 and
worsened in 2008. UBS entered 2008 with significant legacy risk positions,
particularly related to US real estate and other credit positions, which exceeded
the firm’s risk bearing capacity. As reported during 2008, UBS incurred signifi-
cant losses on these positions. Risk reduction will remain a priority for UBS
until risk exposure is commensurate with the firm’s targeted risk appetite. UBS
identified significant weaknesses in its risk management and control organiza-
tion, as well as limitations in its traditional market risk, credit risk, liquidity
risk and funding risk measures (including the interplay between these mea-
sures). As a result of these weaknesses, the firm failed to adequately assess
correlated risks and risk concentrations.26
Prior to the crisis, UBS followed a “silo” approach to risk management.27 Each
group within the organizational structure had a role to play in the risk manage-
ment process, but there was little coordination, communication, or monitoring
among the groups. For example, UBS’s Board of Directors was “responsible for the
firm’s fundamental approach to risk, for approving . . . risk principles and for
determining . . . risk capacity.”28 The board had no meaningful involvement, how-
ever, in the development, implementation, or monitoring of the process. Those
tasks were divided among various groups, including the Executive Board, the Chief
Risk Officer, the Chief Financial Officer, and the General Counsel.29 This silo or
segregated approach to risk management was and, to some extent, still is common
among financial institutions and other firms.30 Moreover, many firms, including
26. UBS AG, Annual Report (Form 20-F), at 120 (Mar. 11, 2009) (for the period ending Dec. 31, 2008).
27. See Thomas L. Barton et al., Making Enterprise Risk Management Pay Off 11 (2002) (distin-
guishing the silo approach from firm-wide enterprise risk management and discussing the early prevalence of
the silo approach); Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 9, at 581 (explaining the silo approach as the “management
of insurance, foreign exchange risk, operational risk, credit risk, and commodity risks each conducted as nar-
rowly-focused and fragmented activities”).
28. UBS AG, Handbook 2006/2007, at 58, http://www.ubs.com/1/e/investors/annualreporting/archive.
html?template=layer&selected=125275 (follow the “English” hyperlink in the “Handbook” column and “2006”
row) [hereinafter UBS AG Handbook].
29. Id. UBS describes its Executive Board as an executive team that includes “the Group CEO, the CEOs of
the three Business Groups as well as senior leaders representing major growth businesses and geographic mar-
kets” and that is responsible for business management. See UBS AG, Annual Review 2006, at 32, http://www.
ubs.com/1/e/investors/annualreporting/archive.html (follow the “English” hyperlink in the “Annual Review”
column and “2006” row) (explaining the structure and purpose of the Executive Board and the dual board
requirement imposed under Swiss banking law).
30. See, e.g., Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 9, at 581, 587 (noting that “many organizations still continue
to address risk in ‘silos’ ” and explaining that this structure often is a CEO-centric model); see also Citigroup
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 59 (Feb. 23, 2007) (“The independent risk managers at the business level
are responsible for establishing and implementing risk management policies and practices within their busi-
ness, for overseeing the risk in their business, and for responding to the needs and issues of their business.”);
Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 105 (Jan. 27, 2009) (“Segregation of duties and
management oversight are fundamental elements of our risk management process.”);  Goldman Sachs Group
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 88 (Feb. 6, 2007) (same). Notably, Citigroup revamped its approach to
risk management during 2008 and now reports that “[s]ignificant focus has been placed on fostering a risk
50 journal of business & technology law
27675 m
lb_5-1 Sheet No. 29 Side A      02/18/2010   11:56:44
27675 mlb_5-1 Sheet No. 29 Side A
\\server05\productn\M\MLB\5-1\MLB103.txt unknown Seq: 7 10-FEB-10 7:35
Michelle M. Harner
UBS, Lehman Brothers, and Wachovia, limited the role of the board in the risk
management process.31
In response to the crisis, UBS revamped its risk management structure to,
among other things, “strengthen the roles and responsibilities” of the board and
“integrate its approach to risk control.”32 UBS created a new risk committee of the
board to “oversee[ ] the firm’s risk profile and the implementation of risk manage-
ment and control principles.”33 It also increased the emphasis on risk reporting,
providing for certain daily reports to senior management and monthly and quar-
terly reports from the business divisions for purposes of updating the board.34  Al-
though the value of any ERM program lies primarily in its execution, UBS at least
is establishing a viable framework.
Best practices promulgated by industry organizations urge firms to take an inte-
grated approach to ERM. “Cultivation of a consistent ‘risk culture’ throughout
firms is the most important element in risk management.”35 These reports empha-
size that risk management cannot be static and is most effective when it is “built
into an entity’s infrastructure” and “intertwined with an entity’s operating
activities.”36
The board can play a key role in developing a firm’s ERM and cultivating a risk
culture. Some commentators suggest that the board, among other things,
“evaluat[e] the risks associated with corporate strategies, defin[e] the risk appetite
of the company, [and] ensur[e] that appropriate resources are devoted to risk iden-
tification, avoidance, and mitigation.”37 Others urge boards to review and reassess
the composition and expertise of risk management committees, clearly define re-
culture based on a policy of ‘Taking Intelligent Risk with Shared Responsibility, without forsaking Individual
Accountability.’ ”  Citigroup 10-K 2009, supra note 18, at 51.
31. Lehman Bros. Holding, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 69 (Jan. 29, 2009) (board members not
included in risk committee); Wachovia Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 34 (Feb. 28, 2007), available at
https://www.wachovia.com/common_files/2006_Annual_Report.pdf (explaining that board members are not
included in the risk committee; the risk committee reports to the board of directors); see also supra notes 27–29
and accompanying text.
32. UBS AG, Annual Report (Form 20-F), at 120 (Mar. 11, 2009) (for the period ending Dec. 31, 2008).
33. Id. at 121.
34. Id. at 122.
35. Peter Green & Jeremy Jennings-Mares, IIF’s Final Report on Market Best Practices for Financial Institu-
tions and Financial Products, Banking & Fin. Serv. Pol’y Rep., Sept. 2008, at 1; see also Conference Board
Report, supra note 9, at 23 (quoting Jenne K. Britell, Chairman and CEO, Structured Ventures, Inc. and
director of various companies as saying “[w]ithout tone at the top, a company can never have enough auditors,
lawyers or compliance to make risk oversight work”).
36. COSO Report, supra note 8, at 17.
37. Barker, supra note 10, at 2; see also Contemporary Risk Mgmt. Policy Group, Containing Sys-
temic Risk:  The Road to Reform 11–12 (2008), http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/docs/CRMPG-III.pdf
[hereinafter CRMPG Report] (recommending “comprehensive exercises aimed at estimating risk appetite” and
encouraging involvement of the board and senior management).
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 51
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sponsibility for risk decisions, and ensure a robust reporting system.38 To perform
any of these tasks, “the boards need to be educated on risk issues and to be given
the means to understand risk appetite and the firm’s performance against it.”39
Consequently, communication and coordination among the board, senior man-
agement, and others in the firm are essential to effective ERM. These elements also
are among the most challenging for large business entities to implement. Some
commentators suggest using a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) to facilitate information
flow; others suggest forming a risk committee separate from the board’s audit com-
mittee that includes at least some independent board members and perhaps man-
agement.40 No one form of ERM will fit every firm, and simply designating a CRO
or creating a separate risk committee is not enough. All parties involved in the
firm’s ERM program, including the board, must be engaged in the process.
The question then becomes how to encourage firms to adopt meaningful ERM
programs, given the extensive reporting requirements, compliance programs, and
operational issues already demanding their upmost attention. Proponents of ERM
suggest that comprehensive risk management is not an “add on,” but rather an
assessment tool that infiltrates all aspects of the business, including reporting and
compliance.41 From this perspective, ERM could streamline existing responsibilities
and enhance overall operations and performance results.42 But this possible upside
likely is a tough sale in corporate America, even after the 2008 economic crisis.43
encouraging erm
Linking ERM to firm profitability likely would accelerate the ERM movement.
Most firms seek to maximize returns to investors. Consequently, firms tend to
adopt voluntarily (or involuntarily, under market or investor pressure) techniques,
like ERM, that potentially enhance those returns.44 Additional empirical research
38. See, e.g., Conference Board Report, supra note 9, at 6–7 (recommending six primary tasks for
boards considering ERM); Lipton et al., supra note 9, at 15–17 (encouraging boards to review committee
composition, undertake risk management training, and improve lines of communication).
39. Kirkpatrick, supra note 4, at 19 (summarizing findings of a report by the Institute of International
Finance (IIF), which examined board performance).
40. See, e.g., Green & Jennings-Mares, supra note 35, at 1 (noting that the IIF recommends designating “a
Chief Risk Officer (CRO) with sufficient seniority, authority, and independence from line business manage-
ment to have a meaningful impact on decisions”); Kirkpatrick, supra note 4, at 19 (discussing value of CROs
and separate risk committees).
41. See, e.g., Conference Board Report, supra note 9, at 10 (“ERM should not be seen as an entirely new
and separate infrastructure.”); COSO Report, supra note 8, at 17 (disputing notion that ERM is “something
added on to an entity’s activities”).
42. See, e.g., Conference Board Report, supra note 9, at 18 (citing survey data to suggest that, as ERM
develops, “directors’ perceptions of risk management oversight [will] evolve from a compliance practice to an
exercise that is meant to bring clarity, focus and efficiency to the strategy-setting role of the corporate board”).
43. Id. (“Many directors interviewed resisted what they termed ‘an excessively formal’ way to incorporate
risk management into their deliberations.”).
44. See Cas. Actuarial Soc’y, Overview of Enterprise Risk Management 27 (2003) (citing examples
of organizations implementing ERM and benefiting from increased investment returns and decreased capital
52 journal of business & technology law
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demonstrating the value of ERM—either by increasing profits or reducing losses—
is needed and warranted.45
Potential legal liability also influences corporate conduct. A board’s failure
to implement an effective ERM program would appear to breach the board’s
duty of care. Indeed, without effective ERM, a board arguably is approving
overall firm strategy or making other critical decisions without necessary and
adequate information.46 Nevertheless, litigants and courts generally cast ERM
claims as failure-to-monitor claims, perhaps because of the barriers to imposing
duty of care liability on boards.47 A failure-to-monitor claim is governed largely
by the standards articulated in three Delaware state court decisions,48 i.e.,
requirements); see also COSO Report, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that ERM enables management to enhance
value building capacity).
45. See Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 9, at 582–83, 585 (citing several studies on ERM and noting that
“[o]ne deterrent [to major companies implementing ERM] is the need for more information on implementing
ERM, including case studies and educational materials”); see also COSO Report, supra note 8, at 1 (“Value is
maximized when management sets strategy and objectives to strike an optimal balance between growth and
return goals and related risks, and efficiently and effectively deploys resources in pursuit of the entity’s objec-
tives.”). “In addition, ratings agencies, institutional investors, and insurance companies underwriting directors’
and officers’ liability insurance policies are increasingly focusing on whether companies have ERM processes in
place.” Conference Board Report, supra note 9, at 5.
46. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (finding the board liable for failing to
inform itself of “ ‘all material information reasonably available’ ” (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812
(Del. 1984))). The Van Gorkom decision was intensely criticized and subsequently weakened by legislative
action. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009). See Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on
Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. Law. 1 (1985) (criticizing several aspects of Van Gorkom). But
see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, A Kinder, Gentler Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Less Celebrated Legacies, 96 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 595, 595–602 (2002) (acknowledging prior criticisms and considering contributions of case); Lynn
A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business
Judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 675, 693 (“The wisdom of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Van
Gorkom can only be fully appreciated if we are willing to move beyond rational choice, and in particular to
recognize the key role that socially contingent altruism may play in shaping the behavior of corporate direc-
tors.”). Nevertheless, Van Gorkom underscores the need for informed board decisions under the business judg-
ment rule. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
47. The business judgment rule, exculpation clauses (for example, enacted in accordance with 8 Del.
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)), indemnification agreements, and insurance policies generally protect directors
from personal liability for breaches of the duty of care. J. Phil Carlton & M. Guy Brooks, III, Corporate Director
and Officer Indemnification: Alternative Methods for Funding, 24 Wake Forest L. Rev. 53, 53–55 (1989)
(describing the interplay of exculpatory agreements, indemnification agreements, and insurance in protecting
directors). The business judgment rule is a presumption that board decisions are made in good faith, on an
informed basis and in the best interests of the corporation. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Enron’s Tangled Web:
Complex Relationships; Unanswered Questions, 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1167, 1171–73, 1177–78 (2003) (explaining
the power structure of the corporation, the role of the business judgment rule, and the Van Gorkom decision as
applied in the context of Enron). Although certain circumstances involving potential self-interest, conflicts of
interest, or undue influence may warrant increased scrutiny of board conduct, ordinary-course board decisions
generally garner the protection of the business judgment rule. For a discussion of the business judgment rule in
the context of potential conflict situations, see sources and proposal discussed in Michelle M. Harner, Corpo-
rate Control and the Need for Meaningful Board Accountability, 94 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1393883.
48. For an excellent discussion of these three cases and their relation to failure-to-monitor claims, see
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. Corp. L. 967 (2009).
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Caremark,49 Guttman,50 and Stone51. Under this case trilogy, a failure-to-monitor
claim is reviewed in terms of bad faith and duty of loyalty; to succeed, plaintiffs
must show “a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—
such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting
system exists.”52 This standard is difficult to prove, as reiterated by Chancellor
Chandler in the Citigroup litigation.53
In Citigroup, the plaintiffs “argue[d] that the director defendants breached their
duty of oversight either because the oversight mechanisms were not adequate or
because the director defendants did not make a good faith effort to comply with
the established oversight procedures.”54 The plaintiffs’ primary evidence to support
their allegations of misconduct was the board’s failure to mitigate Citigroup’s risk
exposure in response to market and industry indications of problems in the sub-
prime market.55 The plaintiffs did not dispute that Citigroup had risk management
controls in place, including a designated audit and risk management committee.56
Chancellor Chandler characterized the plaintiffs’ evidence as, at best, evidence of
bad business decisions, which are protected by the business judgment rule.57 Ac-
cordingly, Chancellor Chandler dismissed the plaintiffs’ failure-to-monitor
claims.58
In a thoughtful article, Professor Stephen Bainbridge compares and contrasts
ERM with traditional compliance monitoring and analyzes ERM under Caremark
and its progeny.59 Professor Bainbridge largely agrees with the result in Citigroup,
concluding that “[i]f Caremark is the most difficult theory of liability in corporate
law, risk management needs to be the most difficult variant of Caremark claims.”60
He also acknowledges and explains, however, factors in the ERM context that
might warrant fiduciary liability.61
Professors Betty Simkins and Steven Ramirez present an alternative proposal for
encouraging ERM programs through regulatory disclosure requirements.62 They do
not endorse substantive interference in a firm’s ERM decisions.63 Rather, they leave
those decisions to the board’s discretion and require only disclosure of the firm’s
49. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
50. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003).
51. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
52. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
53. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009).
54. Id. at 127.
55. Id. at 127–28.
56. Id. at 127.
57. Id. at 128.
58. Id. at 139–40.
59. See Bainbridge, supra note 48, at 975–76, 981.
60. Id. at 990.
61. Id. at 985–89.
62. See Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 9.
63. Id. at 592.
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ERM program and significant risk exposures.64 The transparency envisioned by the
proposal presumably would influence boards to adopt at least some form of ERM.
The growing academic dialogue regarding ERM is welcome and complements
nicely the existing business and finance literature. This essay contributes to the
dialogue by asking boards, stakeholders, and policymakers to consider the core in-
formational value of ERM.
erm’s informational value
Thinking about ERM solely as a monitoring process undercuts its potential value.
An essential component of ERM is a firm-wide monitoring and reporting system.
But equally important is the information targeted by the system and transmitted to
the board.65 As discussed above, the board should review, understand, and approve
a firm’s risk appetite and ongoing risk strategy. A board, in turn, must receive the
necessary information and reports to make these decisions.66 A board’s failure to be
reasonably informed about risk-related decisions potentially impairs firm perform-
ance and ultimate profitability.
Such a failure also may warrant legal liability for the board and senior manage-
ment. As Chancellor Chandler explained in Citigroup: “A plaintiff can show bad
faith conduct by, for example, properly alleging particularized facts that show that
a director consciously disregarded an obligation to be reasonably informed about
the business and its risks or consciously disregarded the duty to monitor and over-
see the business.”67 Bad faith conduct is excluded from the business judgment rule,
64. Id. at 593 (“Firms should be required to provide qualitative disclosures regarding their approach to
enterprise risk management . . . .”).
65. Likewise, an effective ERM program should consider and may improve the communication and shar-
ing of information between the board and shareholders. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. In
general, “[w]hen a board of directors seeks shareholder action, the fiduciary duty of disclosure, which is a
specific application of the duties of care and loyalty, requires that the board ‘disclose fully and fairly all material
information within the board’s control.’ ”  Wayne County Employees Ret. Sys. v. Corti, No. 3534-CC, 2009 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 126, at *26 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009) (quoting Wayne County Employees Ret. Sys. v. Corti, 954 A.2d
319, 330 (Del. Ch. 2008)). Although breaches of the duty of disclosure are often difficult to prove, shareholder
communication is an essential component of good corporate governance. Moreover, the board knowingly
withholding or failing to disclose information to shareholders may support a finding of bad faith. See infra
notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 19, at 25 (“In order to fulfil [sic]
their responsibilities, board members should have access to accurate, relevant and timely information.”); see
also CRMPG Report, supra note 37, at 13 (“What [boards] can do, and what management can help them do, is
to ask the right questions and insist that they have the information—properly presented—that allows them to
exercise their oversight responsibilities.”).
67. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009); see also Stone v.
Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (discussing bad faith standard); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (same); Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director?  Revitalizing Directors’
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L. Rev. 393, 417 (2005) (analyzing good faith in the context
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and noting that courts “have suggested that the fiduciary duty of good faith encom-
passes a duty to remain informed and to ask appropriate questions of corporate officers”); Hilary A. Sale,
Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 456, 494 (2004) (“Fiduciaries who ignore deficiencies in the infor-
mation they receive or the reporting system on which they rely violate their duty of good faith to the share-
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statutory exculpatory clauses, and some indemnification and insurance policies,
and it frequently constitutes a breach of the board’s duty of loyalty.68
A finding of bad faith has teeth, but it also is very difficult to prove. Existing
standards require a showing that the board consciously disregarded its duty.69 This
standard may nevertheless provide baseline protection in the ERM context.70 For
example, as the ERM discipline matures, firms likely will define more clearly the
role of and expectations for the board in ERM. A board’s failure to obtain informa-
tion necessary to satisfy its assigned ERM tasks or make any risk-related decisions
may constitute bad faith conduct.71 If the board receives the information and sim-
holders.”). The plaintiffs in Citigroup did challenge certain board decisions, including approval of a share
repurchase program and the CEO’s compensation package, but they did so based on allegations of waste and
not bad faith or a conscious disregard of the board’s duty to be informed. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 111–12.
68. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (excluding bad faith conduct from scope of permissible
director exculpation provisions); Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70 (explaining that bad faith conduct can be a viola-
tion of the duty of loyalty).
69. The term “consciously” generally refers to intentional or knowing conduct. As Chancellor Chandler
explained, “A plaintiff can thus plead bad faith by alleging with particularity that a director knowingly violated
a fiduciary duty or failed to act in violation of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for her
duties.” Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125. Some commentators have questioned the Delaware courts’ formulation of
bad faith and use of the term consciously as potentially subjecting boards to liability for business decisions to,
among other things, not consider certain information. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Good Faith and Risk
Taking, ProfessorBainbridge.com, Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridge
com/2008/10/good-faith-and-risk-taking.html (endorsing an approach similar to that found in the ALI Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance and Model Business Corporation Act). For example, section 4.01(c)(2) of the
Principles of Corporate Governance requires the board to be “informed with respect to the subject of the
business judgment to the extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circum-
stances.” ALI Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 20, at § 4.01(c)(2). But see Sale, supra note
67, at 495 (reviewing the courts’ articulation of good faith and concluding that “[s]uch strong enforcement of
good faith standards by the stewards of state corporate law contributes to good corporate governance norms”).
Courts should strive to preserve board discretion to operate the business. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 46, at 693
(commending the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Van Gorkom for having the “wisdom to concede that
it was unqualified to sit in judgment on the substantive wisdom of most corporate directors’ business deci-
sions”). Nevertheless, insulating every board decision, such as what information to seek and review, from
judicial review guts even the gross negligence and bad faith standards articulated by courts to balance authority
and accountability in the corporate governance context. See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 67, at 411(noting that the
business judgment rule was a “ ‘nearly insurmountable’ barrier to director liability, with Van Gorkom standing
out as the ‘one major instance in which nonconflicted managers were held liable to pay for their mismanage-
ment’” due to their failure to seek information necessary to inform their decision (citation omitted)). Courts
can determine whether a firm’s ERM program provided the board with sufficient information regarding the
decision at hand without reviewing the merits of the underlying substantive board decision. See, e.g., Stout,
supra note 46, at 693 (commenting that the Van Gorkom court “focused on what it could judge—the quality
and thoroughness of the directors’ business decision-making process”). Moreover, the business judgment rule
places the initial burden on the plaintiff to show that the decision was uninformed. See Citigroup, 964 A.2d at
125 (“[T]he burden required for a plaintiff to rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule by showing
gross negligence is a difficult one, and the burden to show bad faith is even higher.”).
70. Neither ERM nor this essay aims to penalize boards; rather, the goal is informed board and firm action
on risk-related decisions. Accordingly, the higher standard of bad faith may be an appropriate balance between
protecting boards that try to do it right (but get the ultimate decision wrong) and those that do not even try.
71. Notably, boards and board committees frequently are called upon to make decisions that may not
directly relate to the ERM program but involve risk assessment and response. See Lipton et al., supra note 9,
at 15 (emphasizing need for the entire board to receive risk information because “risk management issues may
arise in the context of the work of other committees, and the decision-making in those committees should take
56 journal of business & technology law
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ply makes a bad decision, its conduct is within the existing protections of the busi-
ness judgment rule.72
Reflecting on the 2008 economic crisis, the key question then becomes what
boards knew and whether that information was adequate to decide the issues
before them. A potential critique of this approach is that boards simply could elect
to implement ERM programs that delegate all risk decisions to management and a
designated CRO. In fact, that likely is the case for many firms that experienced
losses during the crisis.73 As discussed above, such a silo approach to ERM is
counter-productive for firms. Consequently, market forces and regulatory reforms
can encourage appropriate allocation of ERM responsibilities, strengthened by the
board’s duty to be reasonably informed in executing its ERM role.
extracting erm’s informational value
A primary goal of ERM, like most corporate governance initiatives, is to better
equip boards and management to operate productive and ethical firms.74 Encour-
aging boards to be involved and informed in ERM decisions furthers this goal.
Regulatory, legislative, and judicial responses to the ERM movement should like-
wise pursue this objective.
A board should be involved with a firm’s ERM program from its inception. To
this end, a board may need risk-assessment training and additional, ongoing edu-
cation regarding the firm’s various business divisions, opportunities, and risks.75
This additional knowledge not only will assist the board in evaluating ERM pro-
grams and setting the firm’s overall risk appetite, but also will enable the board to
ask more informed questions of management and professionals and make more
informed decisions generally.
The board’s specific tasks in any ERM program may vary based on the firm or
industry, as the ERM program should be tailored to the needs of the particular
firm. Nevertheless, in most firms, the board should evaluate and approve the ERM
program; establish the firm’s overall risk appetite; ensure that appropriate day-to-
into account the company’s overall risk management system”). For example, the Emergency Economic Stabili-
zation Act of 2008 requires that participants include “limits on compensation that exclude incentives for senior
executive officers of a financial institution to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the
financial institution.”  Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §111(b)(2)(A), 122
Stat. 3765, 3776–77.
72. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (discussing the court’s obligation to respect
business decisions under the business judgment rule if the presumptions that the corporation “acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company” are not overcome).
73. Kirkpatrick, supra note 4, at 1, 11–12 (discussing the impact of failure and weaknesses in ERM on
susceptibility to excessive risk taking during the financial crisis).
74. COSO Report, supra note 8, at 1, 3 (discussing ERM’s role in enhancing management’s capacity to
build value and in setting the basis for integrity and ethical values in assessing risk).
75. See Conference Board Report, supra note 9, at 7–8 (recommendations for boards regarding ERM,
including risk assessment training); Lipton et al., supra note 9, at 14–17 (same).
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day monitoring and reporting procedures are in place across the firm; and schedule
regular board (or board committee) meetings dedicated to reviewing and reassess-
ing the firm’s risk exposure and response measures.76 In performing these tasks, the
board should strive to create an ERM program that links risks at all levels of the
firm and incorporates risk assessment into every major board and management
decision.
These observations regarding the board’s role in ERM are based, in part, on the
board’s traditional oversight role in corporate governance. They also reflect the
board’s duty to act in good faith and on an informed basis. Accordingly, these
observations may serve as useful guidelines as boards work with managers and
consultants to design effective ERM programs and as stakeholders and policymak-
ers consider the value of ERM.
conclusion
ERM promotes a “big picture” approach to risk management.77 It recognizes that
various events may converge to increase a firm’s risk exposure and resulting
losses.78 An effective risk management structure accounts for potential risks in all
aspects of a firm’s operation and analyzes the firm’s overall risk appetite and re-
sponse strategy.79 The 2008 economic crisis is the poster child for improving risk
management practices and, hopefully, will motivate boards, stakeholders, and
policymakers to promote meaningful ERM programs.
76. See supra notes 35–43 and accompanying text. Some commentators suggest that risk reports from all
business divisions flow to a single department or committee that has direct access to the board and senior
management. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. That department or committee also may include
members of the board or senior management. Boards need ERM structures that provide real-time risk reports
to make informed risk and other decisions.
77. COSO Report, supra note 8, at 1 (“Every enterprise faces a myriad of risks affecting different parts of
the organization, and enterprise risk management facilitates effective response to the interrelated impacts, and
integrated responses to multiple risks.”).
78. Id.
79. Id. (“Management considers the entity’s risk appetite in evaluating strategic alternatives, setting related
objectives, and developing mechanisms to manage related risks.”).
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